For some time now I have questioned the idea of “free will” and would like to discuss some of my thoughts on the subject along with presenting ideas of others that support my thoughts.
I do not know when i first came to the conclusion that we (humans) must not have free will but i do remember how i did. The easiest way to reach it is by asking a series of questions: Do humans have free will? Do monkeys have free will? Do dogs? Do birds? Fish? Squids? Worms? Bugs? Jelly fish? Sponges? Cells? Chemicals? Atoms? While this may seem tedious, generally people will at some point say “no ___ does not have free will.” Well my argument then would be what makes any higher level “organism” gain this ability to determine its own future to have an ability to control its actions at any moment. Ultimately I come to the conclusion that we are simply a complex organism making us no more than a very very very complex series of chemical reactions which are ultimately dependent on a set of physical rules.* This means that our perceived to be “conscious” actions which we “choose” to do are really predictable reactions to the world around us. To clarify, the definition of the verb ”to think” is To decide by reasoning, reflection, or pondering and the definition of the verb “to decide” is To influence or determine the outcome of while the definition of the verb “to react” is To act in response to or under the influence of a stimulus or prompting. I would argue that our day to day actions and movements which we define as being controlled by thought and resulting decisions are truly reaction to stimuli of our environment which in the end change our brain chemistry/structure such that we will react uniquely to a stimulus whenever it is presented to us. Finally I ask the question when, where, and how are our inevitable reactions to the world around us perceived as being conscious decisions resulting from “free will.”
Questioning the perception of free will is not rare, when searching on the Internet i stumbled over a couple of interesting experiments done to explore the concept of “intent.” The two articles Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act** and Conscious intention and motor cognition*** discuss the results of experiments in which subjects were asked to voluntarily move their hand or push a button and to look at a clock to acknowledge when they had initially decided to move. The results of the experiment are described in the first article’s abstract:
”The recordable cerebral activity (readiness-potential, RP) that precedes a freely voluntary, fully endogenous motor act was directly compared with the reportable time (W) for appearance of the subjective experience of ‘wanting’ or intending to act. The onset of cerebral activity clearly preceded by at least several hundred milliseconds the reported time of conscious intention to act.”
The second article had similar results and made a conclusion on how preparation for action leads to a sense of control and agency:
“recent findings suggest that the conscious experience of intending to act arises from preparation for action in frontal and parietal brain areas. Intentional actions also involve a strong sense of agency, a sense of controlling events in the external world. Both intention and agency result from the brain processes for predictive motor control, not merely from retrospective inference.”
To support the concept that free will is an illusion one could interpret these articles as saying that our initial mechanical reactions to the world around us begin in our “subconscious” and that later detection of our uncontrollable reactions are then perceived and understood to us as a choice rather than an inevitability. However, the question this argument points at is the same as the question asked throughout this class, it is the question of how, where, and who is having this perception and therefore is the question of where is consciousness in the brain?
The concept of where consciousness is in the brain is explored in ”What Can Neuroscience Explain?”, John Symons’ critique on John Horgan’s book The Undiscovered Mind: How the Human Brain Defies Replication, Medication, and Explanation.**** Specifically, in this article Symons’s discusses what Horgan believes are the three obstacles that face neuroscience. The first obstacle is “Variability,” as in the uniqueness of each individuals brain, which Symons quickly pushes aside as not being a serious issue since variability is commonly found in science and that it is the function of science to “average” the variability with theory. The second obstacle is the “Binding,” referring to the “binding problem.” The binding problem is the struggle in neuroscience to explain how the many facets of the brain come together to provide us with the feelingof “oneness,” the sense of having a unified consciousness, that we all have. Symons discusses the problem and refers both to Horgan and to philosopher Daniel Dennett:
“The binding problem is a genuine problem for neuroscience. However, readers should be alert to the way the problem is presented in Horgan’s book: ‘the binding problem – the Humpty Dumpty dilemma, to use my term – remains very much unsolved’ (1999, p. 43). Horgan’s formulation of the bindingproblem suffers from the common flaw of assuming that all neural discriminations must end up united in a single representational space in the mind-brain … As philosophers like Dennett frequently point out, incautious formulations of ‘the bindingproblem’ often presuppose that there must be some single representational space in the brain (smaller than the whole brain) where something like Horgan’s Humpty Dumpty comes together again (see Dennett, 1991, p. 357). For Horgan, binding is a matter of ‘construct[ing] pictures of the world from many disparate pieces’ (1999, p. 43).”
The following and final obstacle is “Explanatory Gaps,” referring to Joseph Levine’s idea that science will always be unable to explain consciousness in any meaningful way. I found this to relate very much with the binding problem and even more so as Symons argument continued. Here he began to discuss the idea of “qualia,” which is “an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us” aka perception in its most abstract sense. At one point Symons interestingly states that “Faith in the reality of qualia poses the greatest obstacle to the scientific explanation
of the mind.” I believe that the idea of qualia and the binding problem are related to one another. Somehow we have blurred together the many inputs from our brain into a point of perceived consciousness. A consciousness that perceives inevitable actions as intent, a consciousness that is fed different wavelengths of light, frequencies of air pressure and chemicals that have been analyzed and simplified as color, sound, taste, and smell. A consciousness that paints the picture of reality in which we live our lives yet ultimately is an illusion resulting from a myriad of chemical and physical reactions following predetermined rules. We live our lives saturated in the illusion of consciousness perceiving a reality that is not real a life that is not lived. We do not yet fully understand the nature of the illusion nor can we separate ourselves from it. We have been seated in it and are now forced to ride until the illusion ends and consciousness disappears.
*While Quantum Mechanics states we cannot be certain about anything and that all the rules of physics are defined soleyby probability, thereby forcing all predictions of future events to be saturated with probabilities. Yet this truth does not conflict with the idea that people have zero control over the outcome of events.
** http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/6640273
***http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15925808
****http://www.springerlink.com/content/r3120t6482w77565/fulltext.pdf